THE LAW
Unlawful
to Drive Unless Licensed
12500.
(a) No
person shall drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person
then holds a valid driver's license issued under this code, except those persons
who are expressly exempted under this code.
Driver:
DRIVER--
one EMPLOYED in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle..."BOUVIER'S
LAW DICTIONARY, (1914)p. 940.
This
definition includes "one who is EMPLOYED in conducting a vehicle." It
should be self-evident that this person could not be "traveling" on a
journey, but is a person who is using the road as a "place of
business."
Motor
Vehicle: (6) Motor
vehicle. - The term ''motor vehicle'' means every description of
carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and
used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of
passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. U.S. Code
Title 18, Section 31
Commercial:
(10) Used
for commercial purposes. - The term ''used for commercial purposes''
means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or
other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business,
or other undertaking intended for profit.
Traveling:
"Traveler--one
who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or
health." BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1914) p. 3309.
"TRAVEL--to
journey or to pass through or over;
as a county, district, ROAD, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on
foot, on horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, AN AUTOMOBILE, carriage, ship, or
aircraft; make a journey." CENTURY DICTIONARY P. 2034
"...
the streets and highways BELONG TO THE PUBLIC, FOR THE USE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE
ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY MANNER."
(emph. added) HADFIELD, supra at page 517
"The
use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation IS NOT A MERE
PRIVILEGE, but a COMMON AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT of which the public and
INDIVIDUALS CANNOT RIGHTFULLY BE DEPRIVED.
CHICAGO MOTOR COACH v CHICAGO, 337 111, 200. 169 NE 22, 66 ALR 834; LIGARE v
CHICAGO, 139 111, 46 28 NE 934; BOONE v VLSRK, 214 SW 607; 25 AM JUR (1st)
HIGHWAYS, Sec. 163.
"The
RIGHT of the citizen TO TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and to transport his
property thereon, either by horse-drawn carriage OR BY AUTOMOBILE, IS NOT A MERE
PRIVILEGE which the city may prohibit or permit at will, BUT IS A COMMON RIGHT
which he has under the Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
THOMPSON v SMITH, 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579, 71 ALR 604.
"The
RIGHT of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business IS A COMMON RIGHT
which he has under the Right to enjoy life, liberty, to acquire and possess
property, and to pursue happiness and safety. IT INCLUDES THE RIGHT, in so
doing, TO USE THE ORDINARY AND USUAL CONVEYANCES OF THE DAY and under the
existing modes of travel, INCLUDES THE RIGHT...TO OPERATE AN AUTOMOBILE THEREON,
for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business."
TECHE LINES v DANFORTH, 12 So. 2d 784; THOMPSON v SMITH, supra.
"Heretofore
the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a citizen has the RIGHT to travel upon the
public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right
does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, AS A
PLACE OF BUSINESS FOR PRIVATE GAIN." BARNEY v BD OF RR COMM'RS, 17 P. 2d
82; WILLIS v BUCK 81 MONT. 472, 263 P. 982.
"The
Right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, DIFFERS RADICALLY AND
OBVIOUSLY from one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for
private gain... The FORMER IS THE USUAL AND ORDINARY RIGHT OF THE CITIZEN, A
RIGHT COMMON TO ALL, while the latter is special, unusual, and
extraordinary." EX PARTE DICKEY (DICKEY v DAVIS), 76 W.Va 576, 85 SE 781
(cited by Washington decisions) (See also TECHE LINES v DANFORTH, supra, and
THOMPSON v SMITH, supra).
"First,
IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED LAW that the highways of the state are public PROPERTY,
that their primary and preferred use is FOR PRIVATE PURPOSES,
and that their use for PURPOSES OF GAIN is special and extraordinary which,
generally at least, the legislature can prohibit or condition as it sees
fit."STEPHENSON v BINFORD, 287 US 251, 77 L. Ed 288, 53 S. CT. 181, 87 ALR
721, 727; PACKARD v BANTON, 264 US 140, 144, 68 L. Ed 596, 607, 44 S. Ct. 257
and cases cited; FROST 7 F. TRUCKING CO. v R.R. COMM., 271 US 583, 592, 70 L.Ed
1101, 1104, 47 ALR 457, 46 S. Ct. 605.
"Personal
liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one
pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary
for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the
Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property
thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege
which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has
under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions,
travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and
while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering
with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his
person, but in his safe conduct." [emphasis added] American Jurisprudence
1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.
"Complete
freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have
forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet,
under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely
monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look
to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or
less rapid encroachment.". Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180
Wash 133,147
Those
have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have
right to do as such license would be meaningless.
City of Chicago v Collins (19__) 51 NE 907, 910.
Personal
liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our Constitution and laws,
consists of the right of locomotion - to go where one pleases, and when, and to
do what may lead to one’s business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the
rights of others may make necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in
public places. *** These are rights which existed long before our [their
Federal] Constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making
them a part of the fundamental law of the land. Pinkerton v. Verberg,
78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE
11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SEC.
7. A county or city may make and
enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and
regulations not
in conflict with general laws.
"Where
rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda, supra.
A
state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Federal Constitution”.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943)
"The
state cannot diminish Rights of the people."
Hurtado vs. California,
110
US 516.
“It
has been long settled, that a promise made in consideration of an act which is
forbidden by law is void. It
will not be questioned, that an act forbidden by the constitution of the United
States, which is the supreme law, is against law.
The
state cannot change the meaning of “motor vehicle” and “driver” to fit
their own needs:
Is
the proposition to be maintained, that the constitution meant to prohibit names
and not things? That a very important act, big with great and ruinous mischief
which is expressly forbidden by words most appropriate for its description; may
be performed by the substitution of a name? That the constitution, in one of its
most important provisions, may be openly evaded by giving a new name to an old
thing? We cannot think so.” […The
State] cannot change the name of a thing to avoid the mandates of the
Constitution. CRAIG v MISSOURI, U S 29, 410